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ABSTRACT 
Greater capacity for cities to be disaster resilient is needed.  Public-private partnership 
enhances municipal capacity.  This study therefore, interrogates the relationship between the 
City of Cape Town and its disaster relief partners.  It is mainly concerned with policy 
implementation, and as such, investigates disaster management policy implementation in 
relation to public-private partnerships. 
 
The objectivesof the study were to provide a conceptual framework that defines the terms 
eminent in the practice and study of disaster management, particularly those that characterize 
public-private partnerships in the City of Cape Town; to explore the legislative mandate that 
makes provisions for disaster management and the funding of public-private partnerships in 
municipalities; to document the current practice of public-private partnerships in the City of 
Cape Town; to highlight noted challenges in the partnership and where necessary, 
recommend alternative policy implementation options for enhanced partnership sustainable 
capacity for disaster relief. 
 
The researcher deemed it expedient to utilize the qualitative method for the purposes of the 
adeptness it affords in expediting malleable, arduous investigation in engaging with the 
phenomena that “unfold[s] in real-world situations.” 
 
As far as the findings of this study are concerned, the public-private partnership of the City of 
Cape Town with its disaster relief partners is a successful one.  It is effective in bringing the 
much needed awareness and relief to devastated communities.  There are four main 
challenges that impact on this disaster relief partnership have been realized by this study.  
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These namely are the delays in the reimbursement process, the constant change of 
government personnel dealing with relief partners, absence of a disaster relief official on the 
sites of distress and unsubsidized expenses incurred by the relief partners. Having realized 
these challenges, the study makes policy implementation recommendations.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been established that calamity is a “recurrent feature of human life”(Alexander, 
2005:25).  Daily, news reports are saturated by calamities and catastrophes that 
occur all over the world.  In 2010 alone, 406 natural disasters and 234 
technological disasters were reported worldwide,with natural disasters alone 
claiming 297,752 valuable lives, affecting 304 millionpeople (IFRCRCS, 
2011:200). Exorbitant amounts of money spent in restoring the damages suffered 
in these occurrences rob numerous disadvantaged individuals of the very basic 
necessities of life essential for survival. Excluding other necessities, such as 
proper shelter, sanitation, and clothing chronic hunger characterizes the lives of 
many.  Statistics show that “today, nearly 1 billion or almost one in seven people 
worldwide” (IFRCRCS, 2011:8).  Disasters therefore, being increasingly 
common, become“anextraordinarily revealing sort of affliction”(Alexander, 
2005:25).Afflicted and in distress, many in their quest for survivalhave sought 
refuge in cities.  Since capital cities aremostly characteristic of economic 
activities, they have become the destination of many (Bekker & Therborn, 2012).   
 
Studies documented by (Bekker & Therborn, 2012:1)reveal that “[ca]pital cities 
have always played a central role in nation building and state building.Cities, as 
Bekker and Therborn continue to note, have been visible “symbols of power” and 
statements of authority.  Monuments have been erected in cities as adistinction of 
the powers vested in that particular era.  They also serve as “barometer[s] of new 
ideological approaches” (Bekker & Therborn, 2012:1).  The argument thus 
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advanced by Bekker and Therbornintimates that, one by observing or studying the 
architecture and planning of cities, could obtainan inkling towardsfathoming its 
political and historical development.South Africa has three capital cities, namely 
Pretoria, Cape Town and Bloemfontein.   
 
Of the three South African Capital Cities, only the City of Cape Town has been 
enlisted among the 17 cities in the world designated as “Role Model 
Cities”(UNISDR, 2011).  Role model cities “are part of the World Disaster 
Reduction Campaign” for the years 2010-2011, a United Nations initiative 
focusing on “making cities resilient” against disasters (UNISDR, 2011).  This 
initiative wasa call for “all mayors and local governments” as well as“community 
groups, citizens, planners, academia and the private sector to make as many cities 
as possible as resilient as possible” (UNISDR, 2011). Globally, only 
seventeen(17) cities met the requirements of this initiative thus qualifying for the 
“Role Model Cities” title.  Of these seventeen international cities, only two in 
Africa qualified for the said status, St. Louis in Senegal and Cape Town 
respectively.  The attainment of this status is a testament to the dedication of the 
City of Cape Town in combatting the devastating effects of disasters. 
 
In the year 2011, African leaders were gathered in Durban, South Africa for what 
seemed to be a call for Africans to unite against climate change.  Of the guests 
gathered there was Governor BabantundeFashola, of Nigeria.  Acknowledging the 
universal effects of global warming and climate change, Governor 
Fosholalamented the loss of “thousands of human lives and billions of dollars” 
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suffered at through the effects of disasters, destroying property and “source[s] of 
sustenance” (UNISDR, 2011).  More significant is what was reportedlysaid by 
Fosholasubsequently, “All of these have happened in peace time, without war. 
This is the reality that we face. An enemy whose army is not known.A force 
created by our own actions and inactions that is taking human lives almost at will 
through extreme weather conditions such as droughts, flood, severe winter, 
tsunamis, hurricanes and earthquakes and typhoons” (UNISDR, 2011).  Disasters 
threaten and devastate years of heritage, memories and political symbols 
characterizing urban infrastructure.  They threaten the sustenance of millions who 
inhabit those cities.  The inhabitants of the cities, while they may to a large extent 
be responsible for the human induced disasters, they themselves are in peril as a 
result of their actions or inactions. 
 
According to the World Bank (2007)it was established that the public sector and 
private sector ‘have a strong mutual interest to make communities and businesses 
disaster resilient.’  This mutual interest emanates from the government’s role of 
ensuring safety and surety of both people and property, while the private sector 
also needs a safe and secure society to thrive.  Government and private sector 
therefore, share a common interest in the preservation of the environment upon 
which their subsistence is based.  The aura and manifestation of disasters perturbs 
the very foundations of the subsistence of both. 
 
While this involvement of multiple sectors, according to (Bovaird, 2004), is 
believed to ‘dilute political control’, interfere with decision making and 
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compromise accountability; it can still be harnessed with great success to prevent 
and alleviate the debilitating effects of disasters.  The partnership of the City of 
Cape Town’s disaster management centre with multiple disaster relief partners 
and other private entities, is one in many examples that attest to the reality of 
numerous possibilities that, when attempted, could present a glimpse or an 
opportunity for success.  This study concerns the application of policy and 
governance of public-private partnership arrangements in disaster management 
that currently exist in the City of Cape Town, with particular reference to the 
procedure of funding or reimbursement of the City’s disaster relief partners. 
 
This study purposes to closely reconnoitre this effectual partnership between the 
City of Cape and its disaster relief partners.  Effort has been taken to concentrate 
this chapter on the nature and scope of the study, the problem statement, 
objectives of the study, research rationale, research design and methodology. 
 
1.1 THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study interrogates the relationship between the City of Cape Town and its 
disaster relief partners.  It is mainly concerned with policy implementation, and as 
such, investigates disaster management policy implementationin relation to public 
private partnerships.  The Disaster Risk Management Centre in the City of Cape 
Town is a government entity.  The disaster relief partners, on the other hand, are 
Community based (CBOs) organizations and Non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). 
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The partnership presents a unique case thataffordsthe researchergrounds for an in 
depth exploration.  Furthermore, the agreement of these separate 
entitiestowardsdisaster relief presents empirical merits for the study.  The disaster 
risk management centre, being a government department, subscribes to multiple 
levels of hierarchies, and a significant number of policies that characterize and 
govern its operation.  The CBOs and NGOs by virtue of being less complex than 
the government,have fewer of both the hierarchies and policies when compared to 
government.  This is union of government and non-governmental organizations, 
given the disparities in command structures and composure, may present some 
challenges.  These challenges and perhaps the benefits that are likely to 
characterize such a partnership are the focus of this study. 
 
Though the partnership seems complicated, given the disparities in the makeup 
and mode of operation between the government and the disaster relief partners, 
there are some common ground that can be noted in the partnership.  The disaster 
risk management centre and the disaster relief partners both seek to provide 
disaster relief.  They both serve in the same jurisdiction.  They are complementary 
to each other.  They both seek to serve communities distressed by disasters.  
Where the disaster relief need expertise and equipment the disaster risk 
management centre provides.  Where the disaster risk management centre needs 
additional resources, the partners supplement, thus capacity is enhanced.  
Thatthey are all on same geographical area also benefits both parties. As far as 
mobility and access is concerned, they are in close geographical proximityof 
about 30 kilometer radius.  This proximity benefits the researcher as well, 
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reducing the cost of commuting significantly while affording him access to the 
organizations under study. 
 
1.2 THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The City of Cape Town has a unique disaster relief partnership model that seems 
to optimize its capacity for better disaster preparedness, relief and recovery.  The 
model, being unique to the City of Cape Town may serve a proverbial guinea pig 
for other municipalities.  The efficiency and effectiveness provided by this model 
needs to be documented as well as the challenges that may handicap it.   
 
Should this model remain unappreciated and the challenges thereof unnoted and 
ignored, its demise will be inevitable.  This study seeks to explore this public-
private partnership between the disaster risk management centre and its disaster 
relief partners, with the intention of highlighting challenges that may characterize 
the partnership to prevent a long chain of deleterious circumstances that 
eventually result in delivery failure if the challenges go unnoticed.  When noted 
and effort is made for improvement, the /City of Cape Town will be better 
capacitated, better prepared, effective and efficient in disaster relief. 
 
1.3 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
In pursuing the overall aim of the study, the researcher investigates the public-
private trajectory of the City of Cape Town and its disaster relief partners to 
establish the operational procedure and possible challenges that threaten the 
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partnership.  For more clarity and enhancement of the study, the study is further 
broken down into five manageable objectives. 
 
The first objective was for the researcher to provide a conceptual framework that 
defines the terms eminent in the practice and study of disaster management, 
particularly those that characterize public-private partnerships in the City of Cape 
Town.  The second objective sought to explore the legislative mandate that makes 
provisions for disaster management and the funding of public-private partnerships 
in municipalities.  The third objective of the study was to document the current 
practice of public-private partnerships in the City of Cape Town.  Concurrent with 
the documentation of the current practice,this study sought to outline the 
relationship between the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre 
and its relief partners.  The fourth objective of the study was to highlight noted 
challenges in the partnership and the funding procedure and then.  Lastly, the 
study sought to,where necessary, makerecommendations for anenhanced 
partnership andsustainable capacity for disaster relief. 
 
1.4 THE RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
The value of the study is anchored in its employment of the chosen “qualitative” 
method, whose “raw materials” are “generated in vivo, close to the point of 
origin” (Maanen, 1979).  The researcher deemed it expedient to utilize this 
method for the purposes of the adeptness it affords in expediting malleable, 
arduous investigation in engaging with the phenomena that “unfold[s] in real-
world situations” (Durrheim, 1999 :43).  In essence, the qualitative method 
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capacitates the researcher to observe the phenomena under study in close 
proximity, viewing it from the vantage point of the practitioners. This is necessary 
because (Robson, 1993:28) indicates that exploratory studies are valuable means 
of “…finding out and seeking new insights, as well as assessing phenomena in a 
new light”.  A cogent argument in explanation of the insight thus gained in the 
collection of data was made, valid conclusions are arrived at, which in turn, 
yielded relevant recommendations. 
 
The qualitative method tilts the scales on its counterpart, the quantitative method 
when compared in view of the objectives of this study.  Though the two are not 
mutually exclusive and can be employed simultaneously, Maanen (1979) when 
contrasting researchers utilizing the two methods observed that, a quantitative 
researcher needs to design a research instrument to be administered in a 
standardized manner according to predetermined procedures. Thus any 
phenomenon observed that falls outside the designated parameters of the 
predetermined procedures and standards, may not be captured and its relevance, 
that could have led to the piecing together of ameliorating solutions is lost. 
 
The analysis of the complex nature of the phenomena which concerns this study 
necessitates a rather intimate investigation.  Accurate capturing of the intricacies 
manifest in this unique study, and the detail thereof, can be best attained through 
the employment of the case study approach.This research, therefore, utilized a 
case study approach, with the intention to explore a relatively unfamiliar area, 
such that “new hypothesis” regarding the existing situation and “new insight into 
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the phenomenon” is gained (De Vos & Fouche, 2001:124). The case study 
approach is believed to enable the researcher to understand instead of being 
predictive of the phenomenon under study.  It provides the researcher with the 
capacity, pretty much enabling the researcher, to “interpret rather than to 
manipulate phenomena under review”(Yin, 1981).The employment of a case 
study method produced the sought understanding of the phenomena as it unfolds 
without categorizing it into the researcher’s preconceived ideas or manipulating it 
as it were. 
 
1.4.1 Research Design 
The nature of this research and its intended outcome affords it to assume the 
phenomenological and ethnomethodological approaches.  This is by virtue of the 
fact that, this study investigates social interactions and the manner in which 
adherence to existing social structures is maintained. Phenomenology and 
ethnomethodology are described by De Vos and Fouche (2001:80)as“research 
approaches aimed to understand and interpret the meaning that subjects give to 
their everyday lives”.  Thus, “by analysing the conversations and interaction that 
the researchers have with subjects” De Vos and Fouche (2001:80) continue, “the 
researcher is able to enter into the subjects’ life world and place himself in the 
shoes of the subjects”.  Placing oneself in the shoes of the subjects is precisely 
what the researcher intended to do and by extension, what the research 
necessitated. 
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1.4.2 Sampling method 
The population of participants involved in public-private partnerships in disaster 
management in the City of Cape Town is relatively wide.  Since the study seeks 
an in depth understanding of the public-private partnerships in disaster 
management in the City of Cape Town, a purposive sampling method was 
employed.  This sampling method was used in targeting the departmental heads or 
managers as “access points”.  Access points are described as “settings where 
subjects could be more easily reached” (De Vos et al., 2001:253).  Thus through 
departmental heads, access to the Department was made possible. 
 
As the study unfolded, the researcher carried out a snowball or chain reference 
sampling, “the process of referral of one member to another” (De Vos et al., 
2001:145).  Theoretical sampling further assisted the researcher in making a 
decision whether or not the data collected is sufficient, generating theories from 
the pattern evident in the data while guiding the research process, reducing the 
tendency of the snowball figuratively rolling ad infinitum.  
 
1.4.3 Data collection methods 
1.4.3.1 Interviews with stakeholders 
In-depth face to face and telephonic interviews with key stakeholders were 
undertaken.  Interviews as research instruments, among the variety of others, are 
believed by researchers to be better suited for the qualitative research method (De 
Vos & Fouche, 2001; Yin, 2003).  These research instruments are not only 
consistent with the objectives of this study, they are largely significant in the 
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facilitating an environment that encourages the interviewees to reflect on their 
experiences and circumstances. 
 
In carrying out this study therefore, the researcher conducted interviews with the 
head of the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Management Centre to gain, among 
other things, insight into the operations of the centre and the management of 
disaster related partnerships.  Heads of NGOs or persons responsible for disaster 
relief partnerships with the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management 
Centre were interviewed to collect relevant data for the purposes of this study.  
Relevant Government officials that administer the funding process of the 
partnership were contacted for their input into the study as well. 
 
1.4.3.2 Documentary analysis 
Documentary analysis played an important role in the data collection process.  
Policy documentsand other documents relevant to Disaster Risk management 
including those from external sources such as Statistics South Africa form part of 
the data collection process, supplementary to the interviews.  Interview findings 
were documented and discussed. 
 
1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
While there are five disaster relief partners to the City of Cape Town’s Disaster 
Risk Management Centre, despite the researcher’s multiple attempts, only three 
availed themselves for the interviews.  The other two NGOs had all the intentions 
to make time, while they made promises, they however, were just too busy to 
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actually honour the promises.  A similar predicament was experienced in the 
researcher’s endeavours to secure an interview with the official responsible for the 
funding process in one of the government departments identified for this study. 
 
1.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The significance of this study rests in its practical worth, while theoretical 
application is intended for concept clarification.  Though intended to be an 
empirical study, the theoretical themes of this study make a contribution on the 
on-going academic discourse on disaster management, with specific reference to 
public-private partnerships and policy implementation. It sheds light, on the City 
of Cape Town’s unique approach to disaster relief, highlighting the multiple 
stakeholder policy dynamics involved in the process. 
 
As touching the practical value, this study makesstructural and policy 
recommendations that will enhance the manner in which the partnership is 
currently being implemented.  This study, by examining the partnership between 
the disaster risk management centre and its disaster relief partners will serve as an 
eye-opener, assisting the City of Cape Town to enhance the partnership while help 
addressing possible challenges confronting CBOs and NGOs in disaster relief. 
 
When taken note of, issues raised in this study may enable theCity of Cape 
Town’s disaster risk management centre togain a unique opportunity to enhance 
its capacity for disaster relief and preparedness, thus maintaining and improving 
on its role model city status. It is the hope of the researcher that, through this 
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study, the possible challenges confronting the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk 
Management and its disaster relief partners may be abated and that this research 
may bring a fresh appreciation of the unique partnership enjoyed by the City of 
Cape Town. 
 
1.7 EXPOSITION OF CHAPTERS 
The study consists of five chapters.  Chapter one, introduces the study, the nature 
and scope of the study, state the research problem and the objectives as well as the 
significance and organization of the study.  
 
Chapter two deliberates on the background and conceptual themes manifest in 
Public-private partnerships in disaster management.  It covers disaster 
management and public-private partnership concepts.  This chapter further 
touches on the compliance and hierarchical issues within government 
organizations. 
 
Chapter three will reflect on the constitutional, legislative and policy framework 
that informpublic-private partnerships in disaster management in the City of Cape 
Town.  
 
Chapter fourdocuments the current practiceand status of the public-private 
partnership in disaster management in the City of Cape Town.  A brief 
background on the City of Cape Town, the disaster relief partners to the City of 
Cape Town, as well the challenges threatening the partnership. Exploring the 
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views of the NGOs and those of the government entities involved in disaster relief 
in the City of Cape Town. 
 
Chapter fivedraws conclusions and brings forth recommendations while proposing 
terra incognita or unexplored regions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
CONCEPTUALISING DISASTER RISK MANAGEMEN AND 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
A review of literature that advances or expounds on the concepts, content, and 
context of public-private partnerships in disaster risk management is presented in 
this chapter.  The main focus of the chapter is intended to be on themes and 
debates deemed relevant in clarifying or enhancingthe understanding of the 
subject matter.  Disaster, disaster management, vulnerability, hazards and public-
private partnerships are among the main themes that that will be discussed, setting 
a foundation for the study. 
 
2.1  DISASTER 
Some scholars lament that providing a definition for a disaster is a daunting task.  
The challenge mainly, or a “problem” as it were, lies in the difficulty experienced 
in drawing “a clear line” between what should be deemed an accident and that 
which should be categorized as a disaster (Korver, 1986). Kover seems to be 
bothered by the establishment of clear lines or pointers that delineatewhere 
accidents end and where disasters begin.  Alexander (2005:26), contends that a 
disaster is “a phenomenonso multi-faceted that a general theory of universal 
explanatory power is unlikely ever to be formulated”.  The complexity in 
formulating a universal explanation of what a disaster is, as (Alexander, 2005:26) 
continues to note, is mainly the result of the continual “changes in society and 
economy” which incessantly alter the “tenets and controlling parameters of 
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disaster.”  From the issues outlined by these authors, it appears that, either the 
question “what is a disaster?” or an attempt to provide an answer to that question 
is a task of no small magnitude. 
 
Considering the varied definitions given by an assortment of authors (Fischer, 
2003; Fritz, 1961; Gilbert, 1998; Quarantelli, 1998) whose themes include 
deeming, a disaster as being a “passage to a state of uncertainty,” a definition 
alluded to by (Botha et al., 2011:18) who also adjoin that a disaster is that 
unlikelihood or inability to ascertaining and describing (real or perceived) 
dangers.  Other definitions deem a disaster as “an intuitively regarded notion”, a 
state in which the social fabric is disrupted and becomes dysfunctional to a greater 
or lesser extent” and a social (structure) change under specialized circumstances.”   
 
Alexander (2005:27) having considered the definitions brought forth by these 
authors, and the argument thereof, concludes that these definitions are very 
tentative and mostly subscribe to a sociological perspective on disasters negating 
the scientific perspectives of other non-social disciplines such as engineering. 
This further affirms the complexity of formulating a universal definition of what a 
disaster is.For any functional definition of the term “disaster” to have validity, 
there is a need for that term to be tested against a range of environmental and 
socio-technical events. Figure 1 below, demonstrates the complexity of defining a 
disaster and the transversal factors with which it is characterised. 
 
Figure 1: Towards a root definition of a Disaster 
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Adopted from (Perry & Quarantelli, 2005:223) 
 
It is worth noting therefore that complexity may cannot, by any means be 
explained in a word or two.  At the same time, noting that complexity can be 
summarised is also important.  Having thus said, it becomes practical then to 
provide a substantial description of a disaster in rather comprehensive manner.  
Smith in (Perry & Quarantelli, 2005:234) defines a disaster as: 
“multiphased, multi-level, complex and damaging systems-related events 
that unfold over time and space, through an emergent complex interaction 
of elements involving structures, connections and networks and which are 
shaped by ideological, economic and social factors to generate impacts on 
elements of society, represented within a particular “place”. These changes 
are brought about by the destructive, high-energy nature of the 
phenomenon in such a way that it changes the performance of the 
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“normal” order of that societal setting and the networks and associations 
that operate therein. The damage that occurs is shaped via processes of 
agency (and in some cases because of the actions of agents), the networks 
of inter-dependence that they expose or damage, and through the 
consequences that they generate for the psychosocial well being of actors 
(as victims of the physical processes of generating harm). These events 
create considerable problems associated with complexity, communication, 
stress and sense-making.” 
 
Smith in (Perry & Quarantelli, 2005) here is making an attempt towards providing 
a comprehensive definition of a disaster.  This definition, however, is not for the 
consumption of the public, as it may not be palatable due to nature of its 
complexity.  It is nonetheless intended for researchers to utilise it as a framework 
that guides their perceptions of what disasters entail, such that when research is 
conducted, validity is tested against a range of socio-technical and environmental 
events in various timelines. 
 
A palatable definition of a disaster provided by Smith in (Perry & Quarantelli, 
2005:234) will be that of an “event with too much negative energy, in the wrong 
place, at the wrong time and which exceeds the host “society’s” abilities to cope.”  
Further simplified by (Wisner et al., 2004)disasters result from the interaction of 
vulnerability and hazards.  These authors are certain that there cannot be a disaster 
even if there are hazards but no vulnerability.  They also claim that the other 
scenario is true that there can be no disaster if a vulnerable population has no 
hazardous event.  In essence, while a match box and a match stick may coexist, 
there can be no fire.  It is only when a match stick strikes the designated area of 
the match box that fire can be ignited.  Thus it becomes clear, as the pressure and 
release (PAR) model shall demonstrate, that the interaction of vulnerability and 
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hazards result in disaster.  It is perhaps expedient to, at this point, discuss the 
concepts “vulnerability” and “hazards.” 
 
The (UNDP/UNDRO, 1992), described disasters as severe disruptions of the 
community’s operation, resulting in extensive human, material or environmental 
losses which exceed the ability of the affected community to deal with the 
phenomenon by means of its own resources.   
 
 
 
 
2.1.1  Vulnerability 
Picking up from the thought introduced by (Wisner et al., 2004) emphasis is made 
by (Alexander, 2005:2) that “vulnerability is a greater determinant of disaster than 
hazards themselves.”  The implication of this statement that Alexander makes is 
to the extent that, hazards may be in existence and yet remain harmless, as long as 
humans and or their infrastructure are not vulnerable.  To illustrate this point, 
(McEntire, 2012) provides a scenario of an earthquake that occurs in an 
uninhabited area, far from civilisation, such that no human or property is harmed 
by its occurrence; he argues that no matter the magnitude of that earthquake it 
remains only a hazard.  The Sherman landslide that occurred in in Alaska, as a 
result of 1964 earthquake,was characterised by a29 million ton (29 million cubic 
meters) of rockthat slid at 180 km/hour into an uninhabited valley.  Apart from the 
destruction of local vegetation and wildlife, “the eventwas a mere geological 
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curiosity,” a mere hazard, as it were,“discovered by accident during aroutine 
aerial photography over flight.” Contrasting this event with a 
similarAberfanlandslide of 1966 in South Wales which was reportedly “193 times 
smaller and moved25-30 times more slowly”, and yet killed 144 people – with 
116 of them being small children – the latter was a major disaster resulting in 
enormous hardships for the survivors(Perry & Quarantelli, 2005:27). 
 
In the scenarios presented, though hazards remain the same, the distinguishing 
factor is vulnerability.  Thus it can be concluded that a disaster becomes, or is 
deemed a disaster only when it affects human civilisation.  (McEntire, 2012) 
makes a valid point when he argues that, though hazards may be present, in the 
absence of human vulnerability there can be no disaster.(Cutter, 1996:532) defines 
vulnerability as “the likelihood that an individual or group will be exposed to and 
adversely affected by a hazard.”This is also one of the definitions given by 
(McEntire, 2012)in the plethora of definitions he provides for vulnerability. 
 
2.1.2  Hazard 
In (Westgate, 2010:17) view, a hazard is “[a] dangerous phenomenon, substance, 
human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health 
impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic 
disruptions or environmental damage.”  This definition of a hazard drawn by 
Westgate, depict the point illustrated earlier, that a hazards is potentially a disaster 
trigger only when it affects humanity or civilization on points of vulnerability.  
Accordingly, this definition is also consistent with the two ingredients provided 
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by (Wisner et al., 2004), hazards and vulnerability whose interaction results in 
disaster.   
 
Correspondingly, (McEntire, 2012:206) notes that “hazards cannot be eliminated 
or always controlled.”  Illustrating his point he insists that there is no way that 
tornadoes, volcanic eruptions and or other natural hazards can be prevented, he 
applies the same reasoning to anthropogenic hazards such as terrorism, oil spills 
and industrial explosions.  Drawing from historical occurrences and policy 
making, (McEntire, 2012) concludes that when much emphasis is placed on 
hazards, there will be “dramatic” policy swings. The USA being a good example, 
where in the 1970s civil defence and technological hazards were the focal point.  
There was a shift in the 1990s to natural hazards.  Currently, due to terrorism, the 
shift in disaster policy emphasises homeland security.  Citing studies by Birkman, 
(McEntire, 2012)suggests disaster management should place more emphasis on 
vulnerability and not just hazards themselves.  This is for the reason already stated 
that, hazards on their own are incapable of inducing disasters while vulnerability 
may only need a tiny hazard (such as a match stick flame) to be transformed into a 
disaster.  Perhaps, for another reason as well, that vulnerability can be improved 
while there cannot be much done, if anything at all to hazards. 
 
2.2  DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
From the previous section it became evident that a disaster is a complex 
phenomenon, that, while it is possible to describe its effects, defining the thing 
itself is a daunting task.  From this background, it then becomes relatively clear 
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that disaster management is not an easy task to perform either, when viewed in the 
light of the complexity of disasters.Guster et al. (2012) also observed that the 
main challenge in managing a disaster situation is that, it is often difficult to 
comprehend the devastation of an unknown future event that has the potential of 
wreaking havoc, let alone proactively create a comprehensive disaster recovery 
plan to meet or survive it. 
 
 
Disaster management defined by Jeggle in (Van Niekerk, 2006:98) is that process 
which involves “plans structures and arrangements established to engage the 
normal endeavours of government, voluntary and private agencies in a 
comprehensive and coordinated way to respond to the whole spectrum of 
emergency needs.”  Thus it can be deduced from this definition that disaster 
management entails the directing of the ordinary government and private sector 
endeavours towards reducing the probability of disasters.  This entails shifting the 
normal perception of day-to-day activities towards seeing them as having 
potential to induce disasters.  Viewing refuse removal, street cleaning, blocked 
drainage etc. as potential hazards, not only encourages efficiency but also 
promotes disaster awareness.Another definition of disaster management refers to a 
continuous, integrated, multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary risk reduction as well 
as post disaster reduction recovery aimed at preventing or reducing the risk of 
disasters; mitigating the severity or undesirable consequences of disaster; 
emergency preparedness; rapid and effective response to disasters; and post-
disaster recovery and rehabilitation(UNDP/UNDRO, 1992). 
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Citing Coburn et al. (1991:67), who assert thatdisaster management includes “all 
aspects of planning for and responding to disasters, including both pre- and post-
disaster activities. It refers to the management of both the risks and the 
consequences of disasters”(Van Niekerk, 2006) alluding to the Disaster 
Management Act 57 of 2002 – which defines disaster management as “a 
continuous and integrated multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary process of planning 
andimplementation of measures aimed atpreventing or reducing the risk of 
disasters, mitigating the severity or consequences of disasters, emergency 
preparedness, a rapid and effective response to disasters, post-disaster recovery 
and rehabilitation” (Republic of South-Africa, 2003) – seems to suggest that 
disaster management is a process that enables facilitation and coordination of 
government and private entities to effectively respond to disaster risks and 
consequences. 
 
The implications of this definition were not acknowledged in South Africa until 
the “mid 1990s”.  Severely flooded informal settlements in the Cape Flats area in 
Cape Town greatly influenced the formulation of disaster legislation in South 
Africa (Van Niekerk, 2006).  Subsequently, several pieces of legislation were 
adopted by the South African government, prefacing the adoption the Disaster 
Management Act 57 of 2002, signed by former President Thabo Mbeki to be 
effectively implemented as from “15 January 2003”(Van Niekerk, 2006:101).  
The tenets of the Disaster ManagementAct, deemed relevant for this study are 
elaborated on in the next chapter.  Disaster management therefore, as defined in 
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this section, becomes the main responsibility of the Disaster Risk management 
centre, whose function will also be discussed in chapter three and four of this 
study. 
 
2.3DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 
If weight was assigned to concepts, in the disaster management field, it is 
probable that disaster risk reduction would be enlisted among the heavy weights.  
Defined by (UNISDR, 2009:10; Westgate, 2010:1)“disaster risk reduction is the 
concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to 
analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced 
exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise 
management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse 
events”.  The essence of this definition, as provided by these authors is such that, 
disaster risk reduction is the “practice of reducing disaster risks”.  This definition 
is insufficient, in fact, it does not qualify to be a definition due to its utilisation – 
as a definition – of the very concept it seeks to define.  Thus the UNISDR and 
Westgate are merely rephrasing the concept as opposed to defining it. 
 
Remarking about risk, (Westgate, 2010) notes that it is a phenomenon that 
presents itself constantly, resulting in disaster risk being the anticipation of risk. 
McEntire (2012:215) simplifies the disaster risk reduction concept by first 
asserting that risk is “commonly equated to or related with vulnerability,” alluding 
to a conclusion arrived at by most disaster management scholars, (McEntire, 
2012) affirms risk to be the “probability of disasters.”  Implying that, risk as a 
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concept, refers to the likelihood of a disaster, and by extension, disaster risk 
reduction will be the lessening of that likelihood.  Ingleton cited by (Wisner et al., 
2004:37) emphasizes that there are two prerequisites for risk reduction.  The first 
is to clearly understand each society, its culture, behaviour, how that society is 
organised, most importantly, how each society behaves and “interacts with the 
physical and natural environment.”  The second prerequisite and one that is most 
relevant to this study, “the mobilisation of non-governmental organizations and 
participation of local communities.”  (Wisner et al., 2004) deem these 
prerequisites indispensable in diffusing a “top-down technocratic” approach to 
disasters.  Thus the sum of the idea churned by these authors is such that effective 
disaster risk reduction is that which lessens the likelihood or probability to 
disaster by diffusing a top-down approach through societal understanding and 
mobilisation. 
 
2.3.1  The Hyogo Framework of Action 
Olowu (2010) is of the view that the integration of the Hyogo Framework of 
Action (HFA) is a sine qua non, an essential condition or a prerequisite for 
effective disaster management in Africa.  In his critique of Vherchick’s 
bookWisner (2012:126) reports that the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA), “is 
the UN’s master plan for reducing disaster losses by 2015.”  It is a ten year plan 
that was, after negotiations, signed by 168 countries in January 2005 (Olowu, 
2010; Wisner, 2012).  (Wisner, 2012:126) clarifies that the HFA’s five priority 
areas and the specific suggestions it provides are entirely voluntary, since the 
HFA not a legal framework.  This was a deliberate choice made by the diplomats 
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who formulated the HFA, who were clear in their intentions of avoiding “anything 
legally binding.”  In essence, as (Westgate, 2010) clarifies, though following the 
objectives of the HFA is a sensible thing for most countries to do, no country is 
under any legal obligation to do so.Nevertheless, with a great deal of universal 
endorsement besides the UN’scontribution as and supportin the promotionof the 
HFA agenda, it only “makes good sense” for most countries to work towards 
achieving the aims of them HFA as thisis beneficialin setting national agendas and 
promotes international interchange of good practice(ISDR, 2007). 
 
The HFA advocates three strategic goals (1) The integration of disaster risk 
reduction into sustainable development policies and planning. (2) The 
development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities to build 
resilience to hazards. (3) The systematic incorporation of risk reduction 
approaches into the implementation of emergency preparedness, response and 
recovery programmes.It also has five priorities for action which include disaster 
risk reduction being a national and local priority, use of knowledge and 
innovation and strengthening disaster preparedness (Westgate, 2010:3).  
 
The main focus of the HFA is to “galvanize international and natural efforts to 
reduce vulnerability to natural hazards.”  In the HFA is demonstrated a global 
commitment for disaster risk reduction through the provisions of a framework that 
encourages multi – stakeholder engagements.  The HFA provides a platform for 
collaborated efforts between the private sector – which is the main driver of 
economic growth, and the government, whose main responsibility among other 
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things is the safety of the people – in disaster risk reduction.  Since the two 
institutions need each other for survival (i.e. a sound economy for better 
development and safety for both people and property for the thriving of business.) 
public-private partnerships are a reasonable solution that serves mutual interests in 
making both the communities and business to be disaster resilient.  The HFA 
supports the importance of the PPP as one of the most effective strategies in the 
implementation of risk mitigation and the risk financing of high risk countries 
(ISDR, 2007).  South Africa adoptedthe Disaster management Act in harmony 
with the vision demonstrated in the HFA.  The Disaster Management Act in its 
provisions serves as a guide for all three spheres of government, thus themes on 
preparedness regarding perceived vulnerabilities receive prominencein the act and 
should by extension be reflected in the country as a whole (Olowu, 2010). 
 
2.4DISASTERRISK MANAGEMENT 
TheUNISDR (2009:10) deems disaster risk management to be a“systematic 
process of using administrative directives, organisations, and operational skills to 
implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen 
the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster.” This definition is 
similar to that provided by Westgate (2010)only with slight variations.  It implies 
that disaster risk management is a well organised methodological process carried 
out in a manner that provides guidance towards the reduction of the impacts or 
possibilities of disaster. 
 
It has been realised that the South African definition of disaster management, is 
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consistent with the universal definition of disaster (risk) management.  In other 
words, the South African definition of disaster management, as provided by the 
Disaster Management Act, is in actual fact the definition of disaster risk 
management (Van Niekerk, 2006).  This is evident, as when considering the 
definition already cited in the disaster management section above.It is perhaps due 
to this understanding of disaster risk management that, in the South African 
context, where the Disaster management Act uses the term “Disaster 
Management” the term “Disaster risk Management” is employed in practice.  To 
illustrate this point; the Disaster Management Act provides for the establishment 
of “disaster management centres” (Section 43 of the Disaster Management Act).  
In practice, taking the City of Cape Town as a case in point, the Centre is called 
the “Disaster Risk Management Centre.”  
 
It is clear however that disaster management and disaster risk management are 
“not synonyms” (Van Niekerk, 2006).  From Van Niekerk (2006) argument it is 
also clear that Disaster Risk Management is what the Disaster Management Act 
intends to define when it refers to Disaster Management.  What remains unclear 
however, is the reason behind naming the Act and all its ‘disaster (risk) 
management’ provisions as ‘disaster management’.  While contending the use of 
“disaster management” where “disaster risk management” is implied; as a law 
abiding citizen, in this study the researcher, will make use of the term “disaster 
management” solely for the purposes of consistency with the Disaster 
Management Act. 
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2.4.1  Pressureand Release Model 
The disaster pressure-and-release (PAR) model departs from the premise of the 
risk-hazard framework, defining risk as the product of hazard and vulnerability. It 
then presents an explanatory model of vulnerability that involves global root 
causes, regional pressures, and local vulnerable conditions, without explicitly 
defining the term ‘vulnerability’(Füssel, 2007).  The Pressure and release model 
“Is a tool that allows a carefully crafted explanation ofdisasters at different levels.  
It is first used toshow the pressure from both hazard and unsafe conditions that 
leads todisaster, and then how changes in vulnerability can release people 
frombeing at risk” (Wisner et al., 2004:41,45). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adopted from (Wisner et al., 2004) 
 
Figure 2: Pressure and Release Model 
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Vulnerability, as far as the pressure and release model is concerned, emanates 
from what (Wisner et al., 2004) term as root causes.  “Root causes” is a 
conclusive term coined to sum up what Van Reit 2008 refers to as “structural 
elements” in society which, according to (Wisner et al., 2004) are inclusive of 
limited access to power, structures and resources, as well as variance in ideologies 
(political and economic systems).  Dynamic pressures, characterized by lack of 
skills, local markets, rapid population change, rapid urbanization and 
environmental degradation, as (Wisner et al., 2004) model demonstrates, 
aggravates the pressure. 
 
These and other factors further build the pressure up, subjecting communities to 
the third phase in (Wisner et al., 2004) model the “unsafe conditions.”  Due to 
dynamic pressures, many communities, especially the poor, find their lives 
characterized by unsafe conditions.  They dwell in dangerous locations or areas 
not fit for human habitation, with low income levels and other factors that render 
them unprepared for disasters.  When all these vulnerabilities interact with 
hazards, such as floods, earth quakes, fires, etc. disasters are the result.  As noted 
earlier, the mobilization of non-governmental organizations and the participation 
of local communities, noted earlier by (Wisner et al., 2004) together with 
government will play a major role in the release of pressure. 
 
2.5PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP) 
The definition of public-private partnerships (PPPs) provided by (Bovaird, 2004) 
indicates that they are functional “arrangements based on a mutual commitment 
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(over and above that implied in any contract) between a public sector organization 
with any organisation outside of the public sector.”  (Bovaird, 2004) notes that 
public-private partnerships as a concept has a broad scope of application that 
encompasses business and civil society organisations such as community based 
organisation (CBOs), voluntary organizations and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).  The concept further includes other collaborative 
partnerships and alliances that are in most cases without any legal 
“underpinnings,” and those partnerships that, although they are based on 
contracts, demonstrate commitment that goes beyond the contractual agreements. 
 
2.5.1  Non-profit Organizations (NPOs) 
Some scholars have noted the increase of the relevance of non-profit organisations 
(NPOs) in domestic and international policy implementation (Lane & Wallis, 
2009).  Citing studies done by Pressman, Wildavsky and Sabatier, (Lane & 
Wallis, 2009) argue that non-profit organisations would be ideal candidates for 
service delivery public contracts due to their capability of reinforcing the bottom-
up approach of policy implementation – appoint also noted by (Wisner et al., 
2004) – that fosters learning, adaptation, innovation and motivation as opposed to 
the top-down approach.  These authors refer non-profit organisations as “third 
sector organisations,” highlighting that the major challenge with non-profit 
organisations is remuneration for their support and effort.Stakeholders in non-
profit organisations constantly confront problems in in securing donors, volunteer 
commitment, resources, time and effort for the running of operations.  The main 
problem or challenge confronting non-profit organisations is finding or securing 
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funds and effort from volunteers. 
 
The argument brought forth by (Lane & Wallis, 2009)is that non-profit 
organizations’ success is largely dependent on the leadership that directs them. 
Leadership that is of an inspirational style “is crucial for handling the needs for 
constant commitments to the Non-profit Organization.”  Thus in their argument, 
(Lane & Wallis, 2009) conclude that commitments in non-profit organisations 
have an emotional basis.  This implies that to a large extent, the hopes on which 
commitments in non-profit organisations are based “can be subject to erosion 
through the accumulation of disappointment.” 
 
It is therefore critical that there be a “sufficient alignment of the beliefs and 
values” between the NPO and its stakeholders.  Where this alignment is 
established, the interactions between the NPO and its stakeholders will 
surpassstarting point of ‘boundedness’ so that a mutual focusand ‘emotional 
mood’ can be freelyrecognized, and a short cycle of increased mutualstimulation 
experienced satisfaction is reached.  Referring to the work done by Collins (1993), 
(Lane & Wallis, 2009) affirm that such the interactions between the non-profit 
organisation and its stakeholders during the satisfactory stages will yield an 
“‘energeticafterglow’ that ‘gradually decreases over time’ so thatindividuals have 
an incentive to reinvest their emotionalenergy in subsequent interactions”.  This 
implies that the partnerships that involve NPOs are in constant need of nurturing.  
Since the establishment of non-profit organisations is not driven by acquiring 
financial gains, there is a clear need for stakeholders to invest not only financially 
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but in a manner that indicates alignment of stakeholders with the values espoused 
by the NPO. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 
This chapter presents a survey of the legislative framework that underpins the 
practice of disaster management, the provisions for public-private partnerships 
and funding within the broader municipal context.  It commences with the 
supreme law of the Republic, the Constitution. Subsequently, the Disaster 
management Act is discussed, the Municipal Finance Management Act, as well as 
the Municipal Systems Act. 
 
3.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 
Citing the country’s 1993 transitional Constitution preamble (Goldstone, 1997), 
referred to South Africa’s past as that of “a deeply divided society characterized 
by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice”.  The current preamble, though 
not explicit in describing the current state of affairs in South Africa, 
acknowledges the injustices of the past with a vista of “improv[ing] the quality of 
life of all citizens” (Republic of South-Africa, 1996). 
 
In the words of Judge Learned Hand, echoed by (Goldstone, 1997), it is noted 
that; 
“Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no 
constitution,no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court 
can even do muchto help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no 
law, no court to save it.” 
 
In pursuit of the liberty here mentioned, the Bill of rights, “a cornerstone of 
democracy” Section 7(1) was adopted in the South African Constitution to redress 
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the ills of the past.  A brief mention of this South Africanhistory is relevant and 
worthy of mention in disaster management, as it outlines a strong relationship 
between poverty and vulnerability to hazards, an apartheid relic. 
 
Though disasters threaten both the rich and the poor, Botha et al. (2011)citing 
VanNiekerk, Reid &Mokonyama, (2002:63-64) maintain that the impact of 
poverty is a critical factor in the advancement ofvulnerability to hazards. 
Emphasizing this point these authors argue that the correlation between poverty 
and the progression of vulnerability to hazards is extremely relevant in the South 
African context, given “the huge legacy left by the apartheid government of 
desperately impoverished anddisadvantaged communities who are, as a result 
extremely vulnerable to disasters.” 
 
The provisons of the Bill of rights, therefore, are of substantial significance as 
they are not “merely a negative enforcement mechanism shielding subjects against 
the abuse of government power, but that it also imposes a positive duty on the 
state to protect, promote and fulfill the entrenched rights”Du Plessis and Gouws, 
1996 cited in (Devenish, 1999:9).The Bill of Rights presented upon the South 
African a colossal responsibility that rested upon This envisioned celestial bliss, at 
times seems to be “a pie in the sky”, given the harsh reality that even for almost 
two decades since the inception of democracy and national liberation, 
astonishinginequalities draped with racial undertones are still evident (Ruiters, 
2007).  This briefly depicted scenario renders the government fully occupied as it 
were.Yet, beyond the injustices and previous social ills that yielded devastating 
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inequalities putting government on its paces, lurking disasters are as unrelenting 
tyrants, devastating phenomena that respects no man.  The constitution stipulates, 
in Section 41that the role of all government spheres is to preserve peace, unity and 
to secure the well-being of South African citizens.  Thus the threat posed by 
disasters to the well-being of South African citizens falls within the ambit of the 
provisions of this section, mandating the respective spheres of government to 
respond accordingly. 
 
The most prominent feature of the South African constitution as adopted in 1996 
was the autonomy of government.  As such a deliberate shift form the centralised 
approach of the previous dispensation was evident.  The emphasis on the 
separation of powers and the employment of the word“sphere(s)”to indicate the 
distinctiveness, interdependency at the same time, the interrelatedness of the three 
government levels.  The Constitution is commonly understood to refer to 
“spheres” of government rather than “tiers” of government.  Some scholars insist 
that there is in indeed, a difference between the “tiers” or “level” of government 
and “spheres” of government(Meyer, 1998).  “The South African Constitution 
refers to ‘sphere’ instead of ‘level’, probably to emphasise the new relationship of 
cooperation among the levels of government.  This does not alter the meaning of 
‘government level’ because even the term ‘level’ does not necessarily refer to a 
hierarchical relationship” Rautenbach and Malherbe cited in (Meyer, 1998).  That 
the “government level” does refer to a hierarchical relationship is endorsed by 
experience of the former dispensation, its systems of control and 
intergovernmental relationships.  Instead of merely emphasising the “new 
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relationship of cooperation”, the word “sphere” introduces a new constitutional 
era of intergovernmental relationships and systems of control based not only on 
cooperative government between the spheres of government, but also on its 
constitutional status as government in the governmental team of the state: national 
provincial and local (Meyer, 1998).  This autonomous and cooperative 
relationship among the spheres, is a theme that echoes through all the corridors of 
government and is embraced in disaster management as well. 
 
Chapter three of the Constitution having distinguished the spheres of government, 
consigns the same with an awesome responsibility; the custody of all South 
African citizens.  Within the broad parameters of this responsibility, the 
government of the Republic through the utilisation of its entrusted resources, is to 
ensure the well-being of all the citizens(Republic of South-Africa, 
1996)Section41(1)(b). This by implication, entails the “personal and 
environmental”healthand safety of citizens(Tempelhoff et al., 2009).  Natural 
resources that sustain life and promote healthy living such as water supply, 
sanitation, air pollution and a whole lot of others are to be preserved, maintained 
and in a sustainable manner, rendered accessible to the people of the Republic 
under the auspices of Local government as per provision of Schedule 4 part B and 
Section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution.  Given that water and numerous other 
natural resources, and required facilities that minister to natural and basic needs of 
humanity are entrusted to local authorities, these then not only become primary 
functions of local authorities, but Government responsibility for effective disaster 
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management in South Africa as well(Tempelhoff et al., 2009; Van Niekerk, 
2005). 
 
Though a major catastrophic event that can potentially devastate the entire nation, 
the words “disaster management” do not appear anywhere, but once in Part A, 
Schedule 4 of the South African Constitution.  Part A Schedule 4 enlists disaster 
management among the “functional areas of concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence”.  This,(Steytler, 2005) believes invokes one of the 
constitutional tenets regarding cooperative government which maintains that all 
three spheres of government shouldwork hand in hand, in mutual trust and good 
faith byharmonizing theiractions “and legislation”with one anotherSection 
41(1)(h)(iv). In essence,success in the functions listed in, Part A Schedule 4 of the 
constitution, among which is disaster management, will be attained through 
cooperation between the National and Provincial spheres and the harmonizing of 
legislation between both spheres.  In affirmation, (Van Niekerk, 2005) highlights 
that the Part A Schedule 4 of the Constitution endows alegal imperative on both 
spheres of government to guaranteecompliance with the Constitution andthe 
Disaster Management Act in disaster management implementation. 
 
Though all three spheres are to contribute in disaster management, it is argued that 
it is the local government that plays a predominant role(UNISDR, 2003:188-
195)(Tempelhoff et al., 2009).  This is consistent with the operational proximity 
of the local government to the communities, as opposed to other spheres of 
government.  It then follows that when a matter would be most effectively 
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administered locally; and the municipality has the capacity to administer it, the 
national and provincial government must assign, by agreement and subject to 
conditions agreed upon, to that municipality any of the matters “listed in schedule 
4 part A” which may necessarily relate to local government S156(4) (Meyer, 
1998).Meyer (1998)notices that Section 156(1)(b) of the Constitution also 
stipulates that municipalities have executive authority and the right to administer 
anymatter assigned to them by national or provincial legislation as well as 
matterslisted in schedules 4B and 5B. 
 
While public-private partnerships in disaster management are not spelt out or 
clearly discernible in the Constitution, they are neither negated nor censured by 
the provisions of the sections here discussed.  Implicit connotation for their 
involvement is however suggested, given the provisions for municipal 
capacity.Dedicated to the operational detail relevant to disaster management is the 
Disaster Management Act. 
 
3.2 THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT(NO. 57 OF 2002) 
The Disaster Management Act (DMA) is the supreme guide and policy in disaster 
management, all other disaster management policies cluster around it.  It then 
follows that Section 3 of the Act provides that “[w]here provincial legislation 
regulating disaster management in a province is inconsistent” with the Disaster 
Management Act, the Disaster Management Act “prevails over the provincial 
legislation subject to Section146 of the Constitution” (Republic of South-Africa, 
2003).  Chapter 3 of the Disaster Management Act Sections 29and 43 provide for 
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the establishment of disastermanagement as a function of each sphere of 
government, consistent with the autonomy of government espoused by the 
Constitution, through theestablishment of disaster management structures across 
the spheres.  In the meanwhile, Section 7(2)(d) emphasises co-operative 
governance, entrusting the National government the responsibility of making 
certain that co-operation among the spheres is maintained.The national and 
provincial government operational structures and roles in disaster management are 
outlined in chapters three and four of the Disaster Management Act.  For both the 
National and Provincial government respectively, the stipulations of the Act 
necessitate that,among other responsibilities, a Disaster RiskManagement Policy 
Framework, a Disaster Risk Management Centre,as well as an AdvisoryForum, be 
established and implemented. 
 
The Act renders it imperative, Van Niekerk and Visser (2010)also confirm that, 
similar structures as those of the National and Provincial governments, should 
also be applicable toeach district and metropolitan municipality, so that in each, a 
“Municipal Disaster RiskManagement Policy Framework, a Municipal Disaster 
Risk Management AdvisoryForum, a Municipal Interdepartmental Disaster Risk 
Management Committee, andalso a Municipal Disaster Risk Management Centre” 
are established.  Though these municipal structures may support municipal 
autonomy in disaster management, the Disaster Management Actremains the 
primary policy (Section 3), requiring cooperative governance among the spheres 
(in Sections 4(3)(a), 7(d), 7(l) 26(3)and 39(3)).The Act, through the adoption and 
implementation of a municipal disaster management framework envisages “an 
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integrated and uniform approach” among all municipal entities, the private sector 
and non-governmental organisations (Republic of South-Africa, 2003).  The 
establishment and implementation of the municipal disaster management 
framework is “prescribed” as it were, by the Act.  This is evident in the use of the 
word “must” in Section 42(1), (Van Niekerk, 2005:145) also notes this detail. 
 
3.2.1 The Municipal Disaster Management Framework (MDMF) 
The Disaster Management Act specifies in Section 42 that municipalities must 
both “establish and implement” a Municipal Disaster Management Framework 
(MDMF).  The purpose for the establishment of the MDMF is to ensure that 
municipalities have a consistent and integrated approach to disaster management.  
Uniformity in the chosen approach is also among the motivating reasons that 
support the establishment of the MDMF.   
 
According to the claims made by Van Niekerk (2005), the MDMF is not only a 
legislative responsibility, it is also designed to be for operational purposes while it 
“remains a strategic policy document.” It is Van Niekerk’s view that the overall 
purpose of the MDMF includes identifying clear objectives and providing 
incentive towards the development of specific plans that are tailor made for 
addressing municipal challenges.The uniformity envisaged by Section 42 of the 
DMA is directed towards the state intervention at municipal level with various 
role players that include the municipality and statutory functionaries of the 
municipality;all municipal entities operating in its area;all NGO’s institutions 
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involved in DRM in its area and the private sector.  Thus the Act makes 
provisions for and recognizes public-private partnerships in disaster management. 
 
Consistent with the constitutional provisions of cooperative governance, it is 
imperative that a MDMF be in harmony with requirements of the DMA, the 
NDMF as well as the PDMF.  The MDMF and all other disaster management 
activities must be coordinated from the Municipal disaster Management Centre. 
 
3.2.2 The Municipal Disaster Management Centre (MDMC) 
The Municipal Disaster Management Centreis expected or rather compelled (in 
Section 44) to specialise in disaster related and disaster management issues.  As a 
repository of specialty in disaster management, it is therefore sensible that each 
municipality should be equally equipped.  It follows then that Section 43 of the 
Act specifies that “each metropolitan and each district municipality the 
establishment of a municipal disaster management centre (MDMC), whose head, 
according to Section 45(1) of the Act, is appointed by the municipal council.  
Chiefamong the purposes for the establishment ofa municipaldisaster management 
centre is to make certain that the focus in planning and applicationof disaster risk 
management is on risk and vulnerability reduction in communitiesmost at risk. 
Municipal disaster risk management centres are responsible for thecompiling of 
disaster risk management plans. These plans must be integrated into theIntegrated 
Development Plans (IDPs) of each municipality.  
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The IDP of anymunicipality is the most important governing document(Van 
Niekerk & Visser, 2010). All planning and budgetingfor development and service 
delivery must be contained in the IDPs. The inclusion ofthe disaster risk 
management plan into the IDP follows the rationale that 
developmentinterventions remain the best disaster risk reduction measure 
available to anydeveloping state. Thus an integration of the disaster risk profile of 
a municipality onthe one side, with its medium- to long-term development 
objectives, on the other,would yield positive results. 
 
Some of the roles assigned to the MDMC include ensuring that, within the 
municipality there are established procedures that entrance the capacity for the 
management of disasters.  These disaster management procedures or institutional 
arrangements should be consistent with those of the provincial and national 
centres(Republic of South-Africa, 2003).  It is essential in Van Niekerk and Visser 
(2010)that a risk profile which will be integrated into the IDP and the municipal 
disaster risk management planbe developed by each municipality consistent with 
Section 44 of the DMA. importance of awareness creation by MDMC and the 
fostering of a culture of risk avoidance. This means, training, education, capacity 
building and research should enjoy priority 
 
3.2.3 The Disaster Management Advisory Forum (DMAF) 
Across the three spheres of government, a disaster management forum should be 
established(Republic of South-Africa, 2003).  A disaster management forum is a 
key institutional requirement that enhances strategy (Roberts, 2010).Van Niekerk 
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and Visser (2010) assert that an advisory forum is a consultative 
mediumcomprised of various internal and external role-players, in the sphere of 
government in question, whose task is to opine in disaster related issues in the 
respective spheres of government. 
 
Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act permits each municipality to establish 
its own municipal disaster management advisory forum (MDMAF) for a similar 
purpose with that of the other spheres.  A MDRMAF also embodies the principles 
of cooperative governance to which the Constitution and the Disaster 
Management Act refer.The municipal and provincial government (section 51 and 
37), according to the DMA, “may” establish advisory forums while the national 
govern “must” (section 5).  The act through the employment of the word “may” 
seems to imply that the establishment of the MDMAF is optional for the 
provincial and municipal governments.   
 
Concurring with this observation, Van Niekerk and Visser (2010) note also took 
note of that there no “legal obligation”placed by the DMA on local government 
for the establishment of advisory forums.  Yet while the negative impacts of the 
absence of the advisory forums are unimaginable these authors (Van Niekerk & 
Visser, 2010) reckon that the MDMAF is strongly suggested in disaster 
management legislation.  They also add that in South Africa, the MDMAF is 
supplemented by establishedmunicipal interdepartmental committee on disaster 
riskmanagement (MIDMC)whose purpose is to afford a forum fortechnocrats to 
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deliberate and provide resolution disaster challenges.  The MIDMC is mainly 
comprised of senior individualsfrom all municipal departments. 
 
 
3.3 THE MUNICIPAL FINANCE MANAGEMENT ACT NO 56 OF 
2003. 
The MFMA is a piece of legislation that is relevant to all municipalities and 
municipal entities in laying out guidelines for the management of municipal 
finances(Treasury, 2009).  Though not specifically designed to address the 
national and provincial governments’ finances, it is nonetheless relevant to 
national and provincial departments as well as other public bodies in such cases as 
they shoulddeal with municipal financial matters. 
 
While it is argued that the MFA plays a contributory role in the development of a 
democratic accountable and developmental local government (Davids, 2009), 
Fourie and Opperman (2007) maintain that it specifically focuses on the 
municipal annual budget and its Integrated Development Plan (IDP) in the context 
of the municipal annual budget.  Section 21 makes key provisions for the 
municipal budget preparation process. The mayor as themunicipal head is 
necessitated by the act to coordinate the processes ofthe annual budget 
preparationand thereviewing of the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and other 
policies associated with the municipal budget. Subsequently the mayor, having 
gone through the process of developing and implementing the budgetary process, 
with the aid of the accounting officer (Section 68), is to provide internal and 
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external consultation(Pillay, 2004).  This internal and external consultation 
provides a grand opportunity for community members to be informed of the plans, 
processes, appositeness and viability of the intended plans.  Thus a better platform 
is presented for municipalities to prioritize disaster management, while receiving 
feedback, to demonstrate to the communities the necessity and importance of 
preparedness. 
 
The MFA introduces fundamental financial and fiscal reforms at local government 
level.  These include establishment of audit committees, new budget standards 
and formats, improvement to supply chain management, establishment of 
municipal entities and other financial measures.  It assigns  definite roles and 
responsibilities to the role players involved in the management of the municipal 
finance(Davids, 2009; Pillay, 2004).  The MFMA encourages transparency, good 
governance and financial sustainability.  It is based on the principles of promoting 
sound financial governance by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of council 
and officials; ensuring a strategic approach to budgeting; modernising financial 
management; promoting sustainable local government.  The MFMA provides 
clear guidelines on how to link the IDP and the budgets that give effect to the 
development plans.  It encourages the participation of the communities in various 
aspects of financial management such as supply-chain management. Section 117 
of the MFMA addresses this concern and prohibits any political influence in the 
supply-chain management process. 
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Section 120 of the MFMA allows municipalities to form public-private 
partnerships, albeit certain conditions are stipulated.  Among the conditions of 
partnership listed in Section 120, it is noted that the public-private partnership 
must “provide value for money to the municipality” and should “be affordable for 
the municipality”.  Prior to the sealing of a public-private partnership agreement, 
the municipality considering such a partnership ought to conduct a “feasibility 
study.” This feasibility study serves toelucidate on thetactical and functional 
benefits of the envisaged public-private partnershipto establish its objectives, 
providing detail of the nature of the “private party’s role in the public-private 
partnership; the extent to which this role, both legally and by nature, can be 
performedby a private party”(Republic of South-Africa, 2003).  Through this 
feasibility study, as Section 120 prescribes, the municipality’s capacity to 
“effectively monitor, manage andenforce the agreements” is measured. 
 
When a public-private partnership agreement is in place, the MFMA expects from 
that partnership compliancewith allexisting regulations that govern public-private 
partnerships.In the case of public-private partnership that necessitates“provision 
of a municipal service”,compliance with the Municipal Systems Act must be 
ensured.  The Municipal Systems Act also prescribes the sequence for the 
decision making, adoption of the findings of the feasibility study, the distribution 
of the plan for public comment as well all the adoption of the plan. 
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3.4 THE MUNICIPAL SYSTEMS ACT 
Van Niekerk and Visser (2010) argue that, while schedule 4 of the South African 
Constitution refers to disaster risk management as a contemporaneous national 
and provincialcompetence, the Disaster Management Act in (section 23 
subsection 7) noticeably endows certain disaster risk management activities upon 
localgovernment as its responsibility “until a disaster is classified as either a 
national or aprovincial disaster, it must be regarded as a local disaster”.  This 
therefore implies the tremendous responsibility placed upon local municipalities 
and the crucial need to cater and always be prepared for disasters. 
 
The Municipal Systems Act (MSA) was set out to be a law that regulates and 
ensures the integrated development planning within municipalities(Fourie & 
Opperman, 2007).  The Act, as stipulated in Section 23 of the MSA, was directed 
towards being instrumental in shaping the advancing realisation of the various 
basic rights within municipalities, in harmony with the provisions of the 
Constitution for cooperative governance.  To ensure the alignment of local plans 
with national requirements, the MSA stipulates that municipal development 
planning should be channelled through the provisions of the Development 
Facilitation Act of 1995.  Therefore, complementing other municipalitiesand 
organs of state through development planning and strategies as well as 
participationin national and provincial programmes directed towards the same, is 
the emphasis of Section 24 and that of Chapter 5 of the MSA in its entirety.   
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
The adoption of a municipal IDP that is attuned to the provincial and the national 
plans, and the adjustment of resources and capacity to accomplish the intentions 
of the plan is the focus of Section 25.  It also becomes evident that capacity and 
resources to be utilized by the municipality in implementing its IDP ought to 
sufficient to cater for the necessities of disaster management.  This is for a simple 
reason that,Section 26 of the MSA identifies the core components of the IDP.  
Disaster management, though not a prominent feature, is among the components 
of the IDP enlisted in Section 26.  Provision is also made in this section for a three 
year financial plan, consistent with the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) and key performance indicators which, in the case of disaster 
management, may be those outlined in the Disaster management Act.  In essence, 
the MSA provides for the inclusion of the Disaster Management KPAs as part of 
the IDP implementation. 
 
Van Niekerk and Visser (2010) are of the idea that, this provision made in Section 
26 of the MSA issupported by section 10A of the Municipal Systems Amendment 
Act 44 of 2003which imposes new constitutional obligations on local government. 
In terms of thisprovision the Cabinet member, MEC or other organ of the state 
initiating anassignment of a function or power to a municipality in terms of 
section 9 and 10, musttake appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient funding is 
available and capacitybuildinginitiatives are undertaken as may be needed for the 
performance of theassigned function. Transformation in municipalities can only 
take place when funding is made available to finance the proposed plans.  Fourie 
and Opperman (2007:77) view transformation not as that which relates to 
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“employment equity strategies,” but transformation in their view, is that which 
relates “more pertinently to the administrative structuring or restructuring of the 
municipality in order to ensure more effective service delivery.” 
 
The competing needs for financial means is not a strange phenomenon to 
individuals, households and organisations, so in government.  The need for a 
budget formulation speaks to the prioritisation of the competing needs, a process 
that can be challenging at times.  Accordingly, it is noted that sometimes 
lamentationsin municipalities are heard regarding thestrainassociated with 
adapting the IDP with the municipality’s annual budget(Fourie & Opperman, 
2007).  The MSA provides a remedy in the Section 26(h), stipulating that a 
financial plan be preparedaccording to which annual budgets will be 
adapted.When put together in view of the realities that likely to confront the 
municipalities, particularly the likelihood of disasters that are conceivable, a 
realistic financial plan envisaged by the MSA can render an IDP an effective tool 
in disaster management. 
 
As touching public-private partnerships, the MSA in Section 76(b) provides for 
the procurement of services through an external service provider.  Continuing on 
the procedure of the procurement of services through a service provider, Section 
81(1) insists that a service delivery agreement must be provided when municipal 
services are rendered through the employment of an external service provider.  
The act places the responsibility of service regulations and performance 
monitoring upon the municipality.  Consistent with these provisions, the disaster 
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management centre procures disaster relief services from external service 
providers and thus enters into partnership with these providers in service delivery 
and complies with the oversight provisions of this act as it shall be demonstrated 
in the next chapter.   
 
3.5 THE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE ACT (NO 13 OF 2004) 
The Social Assistance Act (SAA) is aimed towards providing“for the rendering of 
social assistance to persons” as well as“to provide for themechanism forthe 
rendering of such assistance”(Republic of South-Africa, 2004).Though this act is 
not specifically intended for public-private partnerships or disaster management, it 
nonetheless addresses social needs that are pertinent to the promotion of a better 
standard of living.  In unison with the right to social security sought and provided 
for by the Constitution of the Republic, the Social Assistance Act of 2004 
“obliges the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures within its 
available resources” to achieve the rights outlined in the Constitution’s Bill of 
Rights(Republic of South-Africa, 2004). 
 
The SAA is intended to assist the government in carrying out its responsibility of 
administering relief.  Section 13 of the SAA states that “the Minister may provide 
social relief of distress to a person who qualifies for such relief as may be 
prescribed.”  Distress describes a situation or a condition that most or all disaster 
victims experience after a disaster incidence.  Due to distress caused by disasters, 
especially to poor societiesthe relief rendered by the NGOs working together with 
the disaster management centre qualifies to be categorised under the social relief 
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sought by Section 13 of this Act.  On the other hand, the Disaster Management 
Act (Section 56) states that “the Minister may in the national disaster management 
framework prescribe apercentage of the budget, or any aspect of a budget of a 
provincial organ of state or amunicipal organ of state, as the case may be, as a 
threshold for accessing additionalfunding from the national government for 
response efforts.”  (Konings, 2012:15) is of a view that, it is this amount 
designated as a threshold that “should be spent on disaster response and relief…”  
It follows then that, while there is no legislation in South Africa at the moment 
that specifically provides for the funding of public-private partnerships in disaster 
management for social relief, Section 13 and other relief clauses in the SAA 
coupled with the provisions Section 56 of the Disaster Management Act provide a 
temporal leeway for the funding of public-private partnerships in disaster 
management.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN 
AND IT’S DISASTER RELIEF PARTNERS 
This chapter seeks to describethe challenges confronting the public-private 
partnerships in disaster management within the City of Cape Town.It starts by 
providing a brief background of the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk 
Management Centre and that of the disaster relief partners.  It then proceeds to 
outline the operational procedure and summary of the partnership arrangement 
between the disaster risk management centre and its disaster relief partners. 
4.1  THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN 
The City of Cape Town, situated at the tip of Africa in the Western Cape Province 
of the Republic of South Africa, is spread over an area that covers 2 445 square 
kilometers.  The city is home to a population in excess of three million (3 740 
026) people to be precise, and 1 068 573 households (Statistics South Africa, 
2011). The City spawns 78% of the Western Cape Province’s GDP, contributing 
11% to the total South African economy (City of Cape Town, 2009).  The City of 
Cape Town “is prosperousby African standards (with a gross geographic product 
of approximately R94 billion in 2001), endowed with quality infrastructures, but 
with veryyoung institutions”(Jaglin, 2004).   
 
Notwithstanding its prosperity, the City of Cape Town is confronted with various 
developmental challenges that include increase in poverty, housing backlogs, and 
unemployment (City of Cape Town, 2009).  It is also characterized by significant 
inequalities, with a Gini coefficient of 0.67(UN-HABITAT, 2010:28).  In the 
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midst of the economic and social imbalances, prosperity and challengesthe City of 
Cape Town makes huge strides towards disaster preparedness, relief and recovery 
through its Disaster Risk Management Centre (DRMC). 
 
4.2  DISASTERS AFFECTING THECITY OF CAPE TOWN (CoCT) 
The City of Cape Town “comprises 300 km of coastline” (City of Cape Town, 
2009).  Disaster experts note that “coastal areas are likely to experience storm 
surges, sea-level rises, increased flooding and (semi-) permanent inundation of 
low-lying areas”(UN-HABITAT, 2010:23). This implies that valuable economic 
assets such ports, railway and road infrastructure, industrial zones, recreation 
zones including residential areas, are under threat from the hazards mentioned 
earlier.  To add on the structural damage that can be sustained by the 
infrastructure, “coastal aquifers - on which these urban areas often depend for 
significant proportions of their fresh water supplies - stand to suffer as a result of 
saltwater intrusion through flooding or inundation”(UN-HABITAT, 2010:23).   
 
There are other threats to which the city is vulnerable which include wild fires, 
structural fires, “especially in high density informal settlements”- which also 
tends to be vulnerable to flooding as well(City of Cape Town, 2012).During the 
period between May and November 2008 alone the was “intense pressure for 
disasterrisk management services in the Western Cape”(Holloway et al., 2010)v 
reports.  Widespread xenophobic violence and displacement of “foreign nationals 
acrossthe province was experienced in May, followed bycut-off low impacts in 
July, at the end of August, a severe storm, “in November,a powerful cut-off low 
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and related flooding resulted in costly damage in theWinelands and Overberg” 
(Holloway et al., 2010:64). 
 
4.3THECITY OF CAPE TOWN’S DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT 
CENTRE 
Based in Goodwood, the headquarters of the City of Cape Town’s DRMC boast a 
modern day infrastructure.  Within the centre is an established “disaster 
coordinating team, chaired by the head of disaster risk management, responsible 
for taking public protective action in the case of all emergencies, major incidents 
and disasters” (City of Cape Town, 2012). A team of trained disaster specialists, 
also led by the head of Disaster Risk Management, works around the clock 
ensuring the safety of the three million inhabitants of the city.  Situated in 
DRMChubis a strategy room, a suitable venue for logistical meetings usually held 
by heads of departments and city executives in view of impending disasters.   
 
A disaster communication hub, enables the relaying of commands by these 
executives to their personnel.  Through the live link of CCTV cameras, disaster 
management staff is kept up to date of the unfolding events in real time.  There 
also dedicated media briefing site enabling city spoke people to release vital news 
when and if required, warnings to the citizens of the City of Cape Town(City of 
Cape Town, 2012).   
 
To mitigate the disasters listed above and numerous other disasters that time and 
space do not permit to be documented, the City of Cape Town has relied on the 
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assistance of a wide variety of early warning systems which include the services 
of the South African Weather Services, as well as their flood guidance 
system(City of Cape Town, 2012).  Assessment studies that provide scientific and 
detailed information regarding hazards was also conducted by Eurecon 
(Interviews with Mr. G.Pillay, August, 2012).  Several organizations have 
partnered with the City of Cape Town’s DRMC which include Rescue services, 
Metropolitan Police, Civil Aviation Authority and NGOs among others.   
 
4.3  THE DISASTER RELIEF PARTNERS 
The City has listed five NGO or NPOs as relief partners, namely the SA Red 
Cross, the Salvation Army, the HDI Support, Mustadafin Foundation and 
ZANZAF.  Of these five, only three will be discussed due to their availability for 
this study. 
 
4.3.1  The Salvation Army 
The Salvation Army was established in England during the middleof the 19th 
century, in the 1892 was the year in which the Salvation Army successfully 
defended its financial practices in an inquiry that was held into its "Darkest 
England" scheme(Irvine, 2002).  It was founded by the then Reverend William 
Booth, a Methodist Minister. Troubled by the plight of the poor in the East end of 
London, he realised a calling to minister to these people. The Church did not 
Agree with this, and as a result he (Booth) left the Church and joined up with a 
local Mission, which eventually became The Salvation Army. 
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Since then, to date, the Salvation Army is very much dependent on the public 
donations for funds.It is in essence a Christian organization, and is part of the 
universal Christian Church. Its ministers are in fulltime ministry, and are referd to 
as “officers”, in conjunction with the Salvation Army’s military structure. In the 
Western Cape the Salvation Army has a fulltime emergency and disaster relief co-
ordinator. Additional support staff is drawn from its fulltime officers and 
employees, and or local Salvationists, knownas “Soldiers”. 
 
The Salvation currently has a lack of capacity.  It cannot provide cooked meals.  
Though it is not mandatory that all these relief partners should have cooking 
facilities, the Salvation Army is of the idea that it will be better capacitated and 
more effective if it were to add the cooking element to its disaster relief strategy.  
Sharing his sentiments about this issue, “I dare say that should there be any major 
disaster, earth quakes and major stuff happening, then we would [be able to] put 
together emergency facilities… to set up a kitchen and cook for the people for one 
day or two days” (Interview with Mr Hitchkock, August 2012). 
 
4.3.2  TheMustadafin Foundation 
The Mustadafin foundation is a community organization.  The word Mustadafin 
means or stands for “the destitute, deprived and oppressed” (GhairunisaJohnstone, 
Personal communication 22August 2012).  The organization was formed in 1986 
in response to the Cross Roads violence.  Mustafin focused on assisting women 
and children with services like trauma counseling, as they were mostly affected by 
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the events that unfolded at the time.  The victims of that crisis were 
accommodated across mosques, churches and halls around the Western Cape. 
 
The services of the organization then expanded from that point on, to include the 
entire families, though the main focus was still on empowering women through 
education.  From 1986 till 1992, determined to create self-sufficiency among 
women Mustadafin carried out health care, trauma counseling, and skills 
development training programs to develop women.  For the sake of the destitute 
children, Mustadafin established a daycare centre.  The day care or after care 
programme flourished such that to date there are about 21 centres run by the 
organisation 
 
4.3.3The Historically Disadvantaged Individual (HDI) Support 
The HDI Support is a Non-Governmental Organization established in 2003 
(Interview with Mr. Stephan Schreuder, August 2012). “The disaster risk 
management centre was at its infancy at the time, still operating from the Civic 
Centre offices, with only a handful of individuals that made up its personnel” 
Mr.Schreuder fondly recalled. The organization broke away from the Salvation 
Army under the leadership of Mr Andre Olivier.  While the team that later became 
the nucleus of the HDI Support was still serving within the Salvation Army, they 
would be contacted in to render relief aid in disastrous situations.  Incidences such 
as fires in the Langatownship, brought consciousness as if it were an epiphany of 
what would then become a dependable and established disaster relief initiative. 
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When contacted, still serving under the Salvation Army at the time, they started 
cooking for disaster victims.   
 
Leaving the Salvation Army, this team which later became the HDI 
Support,worked with a company that existed at the time called Natware(which at 
the time of the interview, had recently closed down).  In fact, when the team of 
individuals, which later became the HDI Support left the Salvation Army, they 
were approached by Natware to form an NGO for the purpose of food distribution 
and disaster relief.  Natware’s function at the time,was to stockand prepare food 
parcels.  Natware was a subsidiary of a “a leading South African supplier of duty-
free/duty-paid marine fuels and marine lubricant and chandelling 
requirements”(Africa in Action, 2012).“Prompted by a desire to be involved in the 
progress of their country”(Africa in Action, 2012), World Marine and Offshore 
Supply eventually, took over, rather establishing the HDI Support in fulfillment of 
a social responsibility. 
 
With the funds received from this World Marine and Offshore Supply company, 
the HDI Support stocks supplies in bulk, 5000 blankets for instance, baby packs 
and various other relief necessities.  As a precaution, these supplies are stored for 
disaster emergencies.  Since no one can predict when the next disaster will strike, 
and the magnitude unknown, the NGOs are confronted with some challenges in 
stocking for emergencies.  Sometimes bulks of supplies are stored, and for a 
period of approximately six months, only few supplies will be required for the 
relief leaving the rest untouched.  At other times, the stored bulks are just 
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insufficient to cover the magnitude of the disaster.  It is then incumbent upon the 
NGO to source for the difference, and then wait for the reimbursement to 
replenish the supplies and at times, settle the outstanding arrangements for the 
extra supplies. 
 
The HDI Support with its resources has a capacity of feeding about 16 000 
victims two meals a day. Providing for this number of people, however, does not 
happen every day.  The length of time for the provision of the relief also varies.  
The Langa fire incident, as a case in point, necessitated the rendering of services 
for a period of about 9 months.  As the victims received assistance with housing, 
the numbers dwindled and eventually the relief was attained.  In the case of the 
xenophobic attacks of foreign nationals, Mr Stephen recalls that the relief spanned 
to about three months of serving food to various camps of about 7 000 victims, 
every day of the week.  In summer the first meal, is served mid-morning meal 
referred to as a brunch, a combination of breakfast and lunch, consists of bread 
fruit juices or sour milk.  In winter, victims are usually served bread and hot soup.  
Hot meals, usually are served to the disaster victims in the evenings come in a 
variety of menus that include stews, vegetables and rice are.  The Department of 
Social development provided specifications for the meals to be given to disaster 
victims.  These specifications apply to relief partners that have the capacity for 
mass feeding, mainly the HID Support and Mustadafin Foundation. 
 
The HDI Support was formed solely for the purposes of disaster relief.  It is not 
every day that a crisis or a disaster occurs, though every can potentially be a day 
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of disaster.  The HDI Support therefore, is constantly on stand-by with supplies 
such as food parcels, blankets etc.  When a disaster alert is raised, a fax or an e-
mail bearing an incident report form sent by the DRMC is received by the HDI 
Support.  This incident report form serves as an order form, wherein the HDI 
Support is informed about the number of structures affected, the number of people 
affected and so on.  The supplies are provided according to the specifications of 
the incident report.  More of the operational procedure in disaster relief is 
discussed in the next sections. 
 
4.4  PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS 
The City of Cape Town in carrying out its disaster management mandate is 
guided, among other acts, by the provisions of the Disaster Management Act 57 of 
2002 in conjunction with the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 previously 
discussed in chapter three.  Because of the de-centralization of power and the 
autonomy exercised by the South African government, each metropolitan and 
district municipality is required to formulate and implement a disaster 
management policy to ensure an integrated and uniform approach to disaster 
management in its own jurisdictional area. This is to embrace the municipality 
and statutory functionaries these include; all municipal entities operating in its 
area, all the non-governmental institutions involved in disaster management, and 
the private sector. As illustrated in chapter three of this study, each district 
municipality is required by the Disaster Management Act, Section 42 to establish 
its disaster management framework after consultation with the local 
municipalities in its area.  This framework should be consistent with those of the 
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national and provincial governments.  Greg Pillay, (Personal communication, June 
2, 2011) affirmed that, in compliance with the provisions of the Disaster 
Management Act,the City of Cape Town, not only established its own disaster 
management framework, but a Disaster Risk Management Centre as well.  
 
The City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre partners with CBOs 
and NGOs in disasterrelief and mitigation.  This is, in actual fact, a “tripartite 
arrangement that involves the NGOs, the Provincial government and the Centre” 
(Greg Pillay, Personal communication, June 2, 2011).  This disaster relief 
partnership model has been in place since 1999, with 2012 marking the 13th year 
of existence.  It was initiated by the South African Red Cross, and later joined by 
the Salvation Army.  The latter stood at an advantage as, at the time, it was 
already running a hostel, and on regular basis provided meals for the hostel 
residents.  Subsequent to joining the disaster relief partnership,the Salvation Army 
availed its hostel facilities and other resources for use in disaster relief purposes, 
setting a trend for other partners to follow suit.  Mustadafin foundation with its 
industrial kitchen picked up on the trend set by the Salvation Army and so did the 
HDI support group. 
 
These disaster relief agencies partnered with the City of Cape Town are not in the 
partnership for profit purposes.  Though they need income for sustainability, they 
render their services for humanitarian causes.  This is an important public-private 
partnership arrangement and is advantageous in improvingthe City’s Disaster Risk 
management Centre’s capacity for apt response on emergency calls.  The 
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arrangement necessitates that the reserves of these partners be fully replenishedat 
all times.  There is, in fact, a corporate agreement in place with five of the NGOs.  
These namely, are the Sanzaf, Mustadafin foundation, SA Red Cross, Salvation 
Army and theHDI Support group.Ofthe five NGOs, the HDI Support and 
Mustadafin foundationare the two most capacitated.  They each are capable of 
catering for about 5000 to 6000 people.  Though others are not as capacitated as 
these two are, the city makes stridesin ensuring that all the disaster relief partners 
have a fair share in proportionto the resources each NGO commands.   
 
The Disaster Management Centre engageswith these partners to bring relief to 
various needs of disaster stricken communities, such as providing blankets, meals, 
food parcels,baby packs, etc.  Because the Disaster management centre is not 
capacitated with facilities to providefor these basic needs, it then outsources the 
task to capable agents while it manages and coordinatesthe process.  Regular 
meetings with the partners are held, quarterly through the Municipal Disaster 
Management Advisory forum (as alluded to in chapter three) and when necessary, 
to establish the terms of engagement.  A fair distribution of tasks is ensured, and 
monitored through a roster system.  The selected provider of services, as per 
consented agreement, is bound by a signed cooperative agreement. 
 
This arrangement between the Disaster Risk Management Centre and the disaster 
relief partners is a unique arrangement to South Africa, that exists only in Cape 
Town, thus rendering the City of Cape Town the only city that is capable to 
perform mass feeding of about 22 000 people in one evening (i.e. 22 000 meals 
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twice a day).  The industrialized kitchens owned by some of these organizations 
play a significant role in the preparation of these meals.  More frequent than not, 
mass cooking presents disadvantages, and at times compromises the quality of the 
food prepared.  An example of this is an outcry experienced during the incidences 
of xenophobic attacks, which attested to the apparent lack of quality in the meals 
prepared; the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre tasked a 
team of inspectors for quality inspection to mitigate this effect (Pillay, 2011).  
This initiative ensured that relief in the form of nourishment attains to a quality 
standard. 
 
4.5THE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE 
The disaster process is monitored in the Disaster Risk Management Centre control 
room.  This control room operates 24 hours day.  About three officials are 
assigned per shift to monitor all calls etc.  In case of an emergency call, the 
Disaster Management coordinator reaches out to the scene to perform a relief 
assessment.  The coordinator then communicates his/her assessment via a two-
way radio or cell-phone.  The context of this communication frequently entails the 
number of people destitute and what their situation requires e.g. shelter, the 
number of blankets, number of meals, etc.  This message is relayed back to the 
centre’s control room, where the decision is made with and regarding the relief 
partners, according to the roaster and the proximity of area affected,the suitable 
service provider is selected.  The roster is then marked out and a record is made 
rendering the process official.Open communication in the establishment of service 
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agreements between the Centre and the organization designated as a service 
provider cannot be over emphasized.   
 
The arrangement with these disaster relief partners was not a planned 
arrangement, but was circumstantial. At the initial stages of the involvement of 
these organizations, there was no funding in place for their reimbursement.  They 
rendered their services utilizing their own funds.  Officials in the City of Cape 
Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre then, upon cogitating about the 
situation reckoned that the arrangement necessitated a funding mechanism.  
Having engaged with the Department of Social Development, the officials 
stumbled upon a clause from the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 (referred to in 
chapter three) which made provision for social distress funding.  The Provincial 
government approved the initiative and the Department of Social Development 
agreed to fund these organizations. 
 
The funding comes from the provincial government, which (provincial 
government) in turn, sources its funding from the National Department of Social 
Development.  In all disaster management meetings, Pillay (2011) noted, that 
there always is present, a provincial representative, a representative of the City of 
Cape Town and representatives of the NGOs.  This partnership came out of 
necessity, as the City of Cape Town is confronted with the challenge of 
urbanization (Pillay, 2011). 
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Since a funding provision had been established with the Department of Social 
Development, based on the providence of the Social Assistance Act, the disaster 
relief partners now have funds allotted for services rendered.  The process of 
accessing these funds requires thatthe organizations submit their claims specifying 
their costs per item.  For example,for each meal supplied the current rate is about 
R4 to R6 per meal, between R30 and R45 per blanket.  For consistency, the NGOs 
and the centre agreed on a standardized quality and size of blankets.  These 
blankets need not be fancy, but adequate for the purpose for which they are 
intended.  Some of the organizations stock clothes as well.   
 
All transactions are kept track of in the control room, where the NGOs submit 
their claims.  These claims, stating the date, place and services rendered by that 
particular organization, are submitted through the office of the Head of the 
Disaster Risk Management Centre administration.  This office has 83 operational 
staff member.  The Centre then captures all relevantparticulars and provides a case 
number for transactionscarried out, while copies of the same remain with affected 
organizations for verification purposes.  Once the records and the invoices are 
verified, and are consistent with the claim, the claim is then submitted to the 
Province (Department of Social Development) for payment.   
 
The Department of Social Development then assigns the South African Social 
Security Agency (SASSA)to pay out the relevantNGOs or disaster relief partners.  
Sometimes, it happens that these NGOsare left with no choice but to wait a month 
or two for the Province or Department of Social development to release the funds.  
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In such times, the Disaster Management Centre officials deem it necessary to 
embark on an unpleasant task of applying pressure on the provincial government 
to payout the NGOs in order that they may replenish their stocks.   
 
4.6CHALLENGES 
This section discusses the findings of the study.  Though not all five disaster relief 
partners to the City of Cape Town’s Disaster Risk Management Centre availed 
themselves for the interviews, common treads in challenges they confront deemed 
significant to this study will be picked and outlined concisely. 
 
4.6.1  Delays in reimbursement 
The City of Cape Town has, since 1999 partnered with community-based 
organisations CBOs and non-governmental organisations NGOs in disaster relief 
programmes.  A corporate agreement that enables the channelling of funds for the 
replenishing of disaster relief resourceshas been corollary to this partnership.The 
availability of the aforementioned funding originated not with the inception of the 
partnership.  It was a consequence of the City of Cape Town’s colloquy with the 
Provincial Government.  Though the attainment of this funding arrangement is 
commendable, access to it by relevant organizations has been fraught with 
challenges.  Habitual delays from the Provincial government often characterise the 
expected release of these disaster relief funds which in turn, adversely affects the 
operations of the CBOs and NGOs (Interviews with Mr. G.Pillay, 2011 and Mr 
Stephan Schreuder, 2012). 
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These delays in reimbursement have been attested to by all the interviewed 
participants of this study.  The organizational relay (between the relief partners 
and the government departments) that characterizes the partnership was also 
confirmed in an (Interview with Mr Duncan Thomas)an official for SASSA. As 
an illustration of these delays, in an interview with MrS.Schreuder (2012) it was 
realized that when an emergency call is received by HDI Support and the relief 
has been rendered, the HDI Support sends the claim to the DRMC.  The DRMC 
sends it to the Department of Social Development.  The Department of Social 
Development sends it to SASSA and SASSA reimburses the relief partner.  
MrSchreuder later affirmed that the problem is continuous, they (the HDI 
Support) are “still sitting with unpaid moneys.”The promised turnaround time in 
this arrangement had been 30 days.  Mr.Schreuder believes that “it can happen in 
that 30 days if they want to”, but unfortunately, this is not the case.  “The re-
imbursement for Services rendered is sometimes a lengthy process, and cause 
unnecessary delays” (Interview with Mr. N. Hitchcock, 2012).  Other NGOs like 
the Salvation Army have not been reimbursed yet (at the time of the interview 22 
August 2012) for relief services rendered last year (2011). 
 
The delay in reimbursement of these relief partners poses a critical challenge to 
the partnership.  It has a potential to sour the relationship between the relief 
partners and the disaster risk management centre.  Since the relief partners should 
keep their reserves replenished at all times, continuing with uncertainty of 
payment hampers their operation.  Interview with Ms G.Johnstone (2012) 
revealed that these organizations more frequently than not, have to go beyond 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
spreading themselves thin, to find alternative financial sources to prepare 
themselves for disaster relief or to settle debts outstanding debts that result from 
the funding delays. 
 
Looking at disaster funding from a holistic perspective or an elevated point of 
vantage, Mr.Pillay (2011) deems the funding of disaster relief a serious challenge 
due to absence of a contingency clause in the National Disaster Management Act, 
that ought to provide for funding.  The result is the current arrangement, whereby 
funds are sourced from the Department of Social development.  Illustrating his 
point, Mr.Pillay (2011) remarks, “if something happens in February, [they] have 
to wait until the second week in October (the appointed time in which the 
National Allocation Committee sits).  Since the National Allocation committee 
sits only once a year, the relief to a disaster has to wait for almost a year just to 
find out if the funds are available.”This reflects an even greater challenge of 
which the delays in reimbursing the relief partner is just a symptom. Since the 
main focus of government is channelled towards development, Mr.Pillay notes 
that the major chunk of government spending is on infrastructure, thus, “there is 
no way”that disasters can be funded as they should.   
 
4.6.2The constant change of government personnel 
The constant change of personnel that handledisaster claimsin government offices 
that deal directly with the relief partners was highlighted among the challenges 
that confront the partnership.While the relief partners would be adjusting to 
dealing with one person for disaster relief claims, and the procedural preferences 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
of that particular person regarding relief claims, in a short space of time that 
person would no longer be there and someone else would be in their 
stead.MrSchreuderreckons that this change in personnel,is due to hiring 
arrangements; people hired on a one, two or three year contracts.  When the 
contract lapses, and the person is gone.  The replacement sometimes comes with a 
different approach, or may not be up to speed with the current operations.  This 
becomes a setback, affecting the smooth operation of the partnership, possibly 
contributing to the delays noted above. 
 
4.6.3Absence of an appointed official on site 
As one who has been involved in the disaster relief partnership for almost the 
entire duration of its existence, Mr.Schreuder recalled that, in the past the 
partnership used to work very well, not so at the present moment.  In the past, 
upon occurrence of a disaster incident where assistance from the disaster relief 
partners was required, there was always an appointed representative from disaster 
management centre assigned a responsibilityof among other things, assessing that 
affected area, who was to be always available on site.  Though this representative 
would not be necessarily dealing with paper work, he would nonetheless, 
familiarize himself with both the situation and the area prior to the arrival of the 
relief partners assigned for that incident. The familiarity of this appointed official 
with the situation, the area and the distressed community, as Mr 
Schreuderrecalled, proved to be very helpful. 
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The challenge with the absence of this representative in the current dispensation 
implies that, when relief is needed, the relief partner(s) assigned to that particular 
incident would in most cases be unfamiliar with the situation, the area and the 
community.  Whereas the relief partners relied on the assistance of this official in 
to effectively render relief, available to their disposal for the understanding of the 
situation, the area and the community is a contact person (i.e. a person they can 
contact who is not representing the disaster management centre, who at timeshas 
proven not be aseffective as those deployed by the centre in the past).  Tasks as 
simple as crowd control, that an official deployed by the disaster management 
centre could have handled with relative ease, now remain the responsibility of the 
relief partner(s)assigned to that disaster stuck community. Such tasks become 
cumbersome and consume the relief partners’valuable time that could have been 
utilised in the distribution of relief packs and services, as opposed to the 
controlling of the crowd.   
 
Citing a recent incidence, MrSchreuder (2012) mentions that two communities in 
close proximity were affected by a disaster.  The authorities consented on 
choosing a central point for food distribution, such that both camps are served 
from that central point.  It happened that, members of one community decided to 
chase the other community away from the relief, claiming sole entitlement to the 
aid.  Subsequent to that occurrence, the HDI Support had to prepare meals the 
following day for the unfortunate community that was chased away, a situation 
that could have been avoided, inMrSchreuder’s view had there been a disaster 
management representative present.  The presence of this representative would 
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been effective in bringing about awareness to both camps of the arrangement that 
was to transpire, preventing the unfortunate predicament as well as ensuring 
cooperation and optimal use of resources.   
 
4.6.4  Unsubsidized expenses 
The interviews revealed that disaster relief partners incur costs (making phone 
calls etc.) in sourcing the relief items (such as food parcels, blankets, clothes, 
baby packs among other things) securing the relief items, storing facilities, 
packaging, delivering, and so on.  One respondent remarked that “They do pay us 
for the blankets, they pay us for the parcels, they don’t pay for travelling, they 
don’t pay petrol, they don’t pay salaries…”  thus, while the partners do all they 
can to aid in disaster relief, they are only compensated for the items they supply.   
 
In most if not all instances, as all the interviewed participants acknowledged, they 
need to hire additional employees to assist in disaster relief, thus incurring more 
costs.  Despite the costs incurred, these disaster relief partners carry out these 
tasks as part of their social responsibility and for the sake of the communities in 
distress.  Some, (the Salvation Army the Mustadafin Foundation and ZANZAF 
for instance) provide disaster relief as part of their ministry and religious 
conviction. 
 
Though according to the interview Mr Hitchcock (August, 2012), there was an 
established understanding that this issue of additional costs has been raised with 
the government departments involved on various instances.  Yet all that can be 
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said about their response is that, “they are not interested.”  Whether this is 
explicitly stated or implicit in the government officials’ behaviour, is not clear. 
 
These additional expenses incurred by the relief partners place upon the partners 
and added strain that slows down the process, making it cumbersome to the relief 
partners.  As with the challenge of the delays in reimbursement, these additional 
costs, placing a strain upon the relief partners, have a potential of damaging the 
partnership by virtue of inciting “donor fatigue”to the “go to” sources of the relief 
partners.  Thus the relief partners may be placed in a position of being unable to 
provide the necessary relief, resulting in the reduction of the City of Cape Town’s 
capacity for disaster relief, rendering the city less disaster resilient. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter draws together the main findings of this study and relates them to the 
research problem and literature review.  It also includesrecommendationsthat are 
relevant to implications for policy and practice.  These are practical 
recommendations which the researcher believes are attainable. 
 
5.1  CONCLUSION 
This study sought to investigate the partnership between the City of Cape Town 
and its disaster relief partners.  This model has proven to be effective in 
optimizing the City of Cape Town’s its capacity for better disaster preparedness, 
relief and recovery.  Through the aid afforded by the relief partners through meals 
and supplies, the city is better positioned to cushion the effects of disasters.The 
efficiency and effectiveness of this model or the absence thereof has been 
documented as well as the challenges that may handicap it.   
 
The four main challenges that impact on this disaster relief partnership have been 
realized by this study.  The first being delays that are experienced by the disaster 
relief partners in the reimbursement of the relief they provide.  These delays 
impact negatively on disaster preparedness since they render the relief partners 
unprepared for impending disasters, a compromise to the disaster relief capacity 
of both the relief partners and the Disaster Risk Management Centre.  This for a 
simple reason thaton its own, the Disaster Risk Management centre has no 
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capacity for mass feeding and two or more organization working together to solve 
a crisis are better than one. 
 
The change in the personnel that deals with the relief partners has been identified 
as another challenge.  This change tends to impact on the understanding of 
procedures and the establishment of rapport between the relief partners and the 
government.  This slows down the processes and has a negative effect on the 
partnership. 
 
The absence of an official appointed by the Disaster Risk Management Centre on 
the affected site of the incidence is another challenge that was identified.  The 
absence of this designated official has negative effects on the smooth delivery of 
disaster relief.  It consumes the disaster relief partners’ time by placing them in a 
tight position that forces them to do other time consuming errands that could have 
been better dealt with by this official, allowing the relief partners to proceed with 
their relief programme as soon as they arrive on the site of distress.  
 
The unsubsidized expenses that the relief partners incur was the final challenge 
discussed in this study.  Compensating the relief partners only for the goods they 
deliver places a tremendous burden on the relief partners.  While they may obtain 
compensation for the goods delivered, the costs incurred through the preparation 
logistics reduces the relief compensation, leaving them less capacitated for the 
next incident.  The absence of a contingency fund to cushion unforeseen 
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circumstances or excess demand during relief also adds to the challenge, forcing 
the relief partners to search for additional funds, and in most cases, incur debt.  
 
This study has demonstrated the complexity of disasters and through the literature 
consulted attempted made attempts to provide a definition.  The meaning of 
various terms such as disaster management, disaster risk management, disaster 
risk reduction and a few others, have been explored to clarify the context in which 
these terms are applicable.This study has demonstrated that there is substantial 
merit in the employment of the two prerequisites for disaster risk reduction 
advanced by (Wisner et al., 2004), that effective disaster risk reduction occurs 
effectively when the top-down technocratic approach to disaster management has 
been diffused.  Understanding societies and their characteristics, as well as the 
manner in which they interact with the natural and physical environment will 
bring success.  Through the partnership of the Disaster Risk Management Centre 
and its disaster relief partners, the study portrayed a working partnership model 
between government and the community, a model that can be emulated by any 
city where similar organisations exist. 
 
Though the partnership model be between the City of Cape Town and its disaster 
relief partners seem to be working well.  Much care and attention should be given 
to the concerns or challenges raised by these relief partners.  As indicated in the 
works of (Lane & Wallis, 2009), NPOs are founded on more personal values as 
opposed to most organisations.  All the relief partners to  the City of Cape Town’s 
Disaster Risk Management Centre operate in a manner consistent with that 
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described by (Lane & Wallis, 2009).  This implies that, though these partners may 
find value in being of service to the DRMC, when and if, due to the challenges 
they confront in the rendering of their services, come to a realisation that the 
partnership is no longer reflecting the values that attracted them; they might 
retract or withdraw.  This would cripple the capacity of the City of Cape Town. 
 
Therefore, that they were willing to participate in disaster relief activities 
voluntarily does not suggest that their services should be taken for granted. On the 
contrary, the services of these relief partners should be encouraged by making 
their work a delight and smooth as is reasonably possible. 
 
5.2  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In line with the findings highlighted above, the study proposes the following 
recommendations for consideration: 
 
5.2.1  Delays in reimbursement 
In unison, all relief partners acknowledged the delays to be due to the 
interdepartmental relay of the claim process.  It is therefore recommended that: 
• A public-private partnership policy be established that enables the relief 
partners to deal with one department to lessen the reimbursement delays.  
• A public-private partnership specific policy that provides for the specific 
funding of disaster relief partners (as opposed to a clause in the SAA). 
• A fund designated specifically for the funding of public-private 
partnerships in disaster management. 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
 
5.2.2  The constant change of government personnel 
• A permanent position be afforded a an official who among other tasks, 
will liaise with the relief partners. 
 
5.2.3  Absence of an appointed official on site 
• An official be appointed to assess the sites of distress, liaising with both 
the DRMC and the relief partners of the necessary preparations, prior to 
the arrival of relief. 
 
5.2.4  Unsubsidized expenses 
• The additional costs incurred by the disaster relief partners should be taken 
into consideration when reimbursement is considered. 
• The centre should have relief contingency funds to cushion additional 
relief costs that may be needed by the relief partners.  
 
As far as the findings of this study are concerned, the public-private partnership of 
the City of Cape Town with its disaster relief partners is a successful one.  It is 
effective in bringing the much needed awareness and relief to devastated 
communities.  The lessons learnt therefore will prove useful in enhancing this 
partnership and will serve as a model for other communities in South Africa and 
abroad. 
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ANNEXURE A 
INTERVIEW QUESTION STRUCTURE FOR THE DISASTER RELIEF 
PARTNERS TO THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN’S DISASTER 
RISKMANAGEMENT CENTER. 
 
1. Organizational background 
Would you kindly provide the background of your organization, stating: 
a) How it was formed,  
b) When it was established, and  
c) By who? 
d) What was the purpose for its establishment? What is its mission? What is 
its vision? 
 
2. Organizational operation 
a) On a day to day basis, how does your organization function? (i.e. what 
services does your organization render to the public on a daily basis,?) 
b) How is your organization funded? 
c) What is your organization’s capacity (i.e. how many people are employed 
therein? How many volunteers? etc.) 
d)  How much of the staff (inclusive of volunteers) assists in disaster relief?  
e) What infrastructure is there and how much of the infrastructure is made 
available for disaster relief? 
f) In disaster relief, what is the maximum number ofdisaster victims can your 
organization assist?  In what means? For how long? 
 
3. Relationship with Disaster Risk Management Center (DRMC) 
a) How and when was the relationship between your organization and the 
DRMC established? 
b) What were the terms of reference or agreement? 
c) In terms of your partnership, how does your organization relate with the 
DRMC on a relatively day-to-day basis?  (i.e. is there an on-going 
collaboration?) 
d) In your view, is this a functional or satisfying relationship, one that 
enables the attainment of your organizational mission? 
e) Are there any benefits to your organization(in terms of capacity or 
otherwise)resulting from this partnership? 
f) Do you work with other government agencies, apart from the DRMC, in 
Cape Town? 
 
4. Funding Arrangements between the DRMC and its partners 
a) What funding arrangements exist between your organization and the 
DRMC? 
b) How did it come about? 
c) When was it initiated? 
d) What processes does this arrangement follow? 
e) Are you aware of any legislation that warrants such an arrangement? 
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f) Do you feel that this funding is sufficient for all that your organization 
deems necessary for disaster relief? 
g) Are there any noticeable flaws, discrepancies or unsatisfying occurrences 
experienced in the duration of this arrangement? 
h) If any, what in your opinion could be the cause of these challenges or 
discrepancies? 
i) What do you think could be a solution? 
 
5. Possible improvements 
a) In what ways can this partnership be enhanced? 
 
 
 
 
 
